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The Abortion Paradox: How States Fail to Reconcile Their Parens Patriae
Duty to Protect Minors with the Lack of Sexual Assault and Incest
Exceptions in Stringent Abortion Regulations
Adina Abrahami*
The right to maintain bodily autonomy has been a tenet of the women’s rights
movement for almost half a century having enjoyed growing freedom in this country in
the years following Roe v. Wade. That right, however, is not absolute, as demonstrated
by a collective attempt on behalf of a number of states to overturn Roe in the past
several years. Fueled by a conservative agenda, many states have endeavored to enact
appallingly stringent abortion regulations—most of which excise sexual assault and
incest exceptions—that are largely justified by the states’ interest in protecting fetal
rights, an interest that falls within the parameters of control granted by their parens
patriae authority to govern.
A state’s right to interfere with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy
is, according to the state, concomitant with an interest in protecting the state’s youth,
an interest that by extension includes the unborn child. In the context of adolescent
parenting, and where the unborn child is a product of sexual assault or incest, the
ramifications of carrying to full-term and raising the unwanted child are as indelible
as they are devastating for both the minor and society at large. Thus, a state’s
regulatory scheme barring a minor’s access to abortion deeply conflicts with its driving
rationale to protect the minor.
This Comment argues that Congress can and should formulate legislation
enforceable under the Commerce Clause to address those stringent state abortion
regulations that exclude exceptions for sexual assault and incest. By focusing on the
economic repercussions of forcing a minor to carry to full-term, and the extent to which
teenage pregnancies represent a considerable financial burden on society, Congress is
well-positioned to enact federal legislation that will offer relief to adolescent victims
impregnated as a result of wanton acts of sexual violence.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2019, an eleven-year-old from Ohio made headlines when news outlets
reported that she was pregnant as a result of a sexual assault by a man over twice her
age.1 A month earlier, Ohio enacted the Human Rights Protection Act, a law
prohibiting women (or, in this instance, children) from obtaining an abortion after the
detection of a fetal heartbeat.2 Under this newly-enacted bill, an eleven-year-old
would be effectively barred from aborting a product of rape.3 Governor Mike DeWine
of Ohio defended the state’s law by emphasizing that “[t]he essential function of
government is to protect the most vulnerable among us, those who don’t have a voice,”
and that the “[g]overnment’s role should be to protect life from the beginning to the
end.”4 Ohio’s Human Rights Protection Act was introduced as one of many in a series
of state-enacted fetal “heartbeat bills”—laws that seek to prohibit abortions beyond a
six-week gestation period5—that did not incorporate an exception for pregnancies
resulting from sexual assault or incest.6
Using Justice Kavanaugh’s recent appointment to the Supreme Court as an
opportunity to craft abortion regulations that would ultimately serve to overturn Roe
v. Wade,7 several states joined Ohio in 2019 in a far-reaching crusade against
reproductive rights.8 These regulations, at their core, were and are predicated on the
State’s interest in preserving the life of the unborn fetus9—an interest fundamentally
invoked by the State’s authority pursuant to its duty under the parens patriae
*

1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8

9

J.D. Candidate, Emory School of Law (2022); B.A. University of California, Los Angeles (2007). I owe an
immense amount of gratitude to my advisor, Professor Melissa Carter, whose wisdom, enthusiasm, guidance,
kindness, and assistance proved instrumental to the research and writing process. I would also like to thank
my friends and family for their untiring support and confidence in me. Finally, I owe a very special thank you
to my phenomenal fiancé, Donnie, whose relentless encouragement keeps me motivated to work hard toward a
better future.
Kate Smith, A Pregnant 11-Year-Old Rape Victim in Ohio Would No Longer Be Allowed to Have an Abortion
Under New State Law, CBS NEWS (May 14, 2019, 9:29 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ohio-abortionheartbeat-bill-pregnant-11-year-old-rape-victim-barred-abortion-after-new-ohio-abortion-bill-2019-05-13/.
Gabe Rosenberg, A Bill Banning Most Abortions Becomes Law in Ohio, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 11, 2019, 6:37
PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712455980/a-bill-banning-most-abortions-becomes-law-in-ohio.
Smith, supra note 1.
Though the 11-year-old in this case won’t be subject to the state’s pending law, thousands
of other women in the future would be. More than 4,000 women were raped in Ohio in 2017,
according to data compiled by the FBI. Of those, more than 800 victims were assaulted by a
family member. In the future, if women became pregnant as a result of such crimes, Ohio’s
so-called ‘fetal heartbeat bill’ would prohibit them from receiving an abortion any time after
about six weeks . . . .
Id.
Rosenberg, supra note 2.
The Human Rights Protection Act “outlaw[ed] abortions as early as five or six weeks into a pregnancy, before
many women know they’re pregnant.” Id.
Id.
See Scott Lemieux, Yes, Roe Really Is in Trouble, VOX (May 15, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/5/15/18623073/roe-wade-abortion-georgia-alabama-supreme-court.
Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri adopted and fashioned their versions of fetal
heartbeat bills in 2019, each state excluding exceptions for pregnancies resulting from sexual assault and
incest. Mara Gordon & Alyson Hurt, Early Abortion Bans: Which States Have Passed Them?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(June 5, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/06/05/729753903/early-abortionbans-which-states-have-passed- them.
“Under the parens patriae and police powers, a state may intervene to prevent harm to an unborn child after
viability.” Sam S. Kepfield, Perinatal Substance Abuse: The Rhetoric and Reality of ‘Rights,’ and Beyond, 1
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 96 (1993) (citing Joyce Lind Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the
Government Intervene?, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61 (1990)).
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doctrine.10 The “doctrine relies on an assumption that minors require a greater degree
of care and protection, and thus a lesser degree of liberty, than do adults.”11 Under
parens patriae, states have the duty and authority to enforce regulations consistent
with their interest in ensuring the protection and development of minors.12 The
Supreme Court explained the justification underlying parens patriae in Bellotti v.
Baird: “[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.”13
In the name of parens patriae, “a minor’s freedoms may be restricted by the
State in order to ‘preserv[e] and promote [her] welfare.’”14 To that end, the discretion
conferred on states under parens patriae permits the enforcement of stringent
abortion regulations—for example, laws that exclude exceptions for sexual assault
and incest—for the purpose of protecting the fetus15 but at an indisputably high cost
to the victims of wanton acts of sexual violence.16 This is especially true in instances
in which the victim is a minor.17 In assuming its role as an advocate for the minor’s
well-being, the State should arguably acknowledge its duty to protect a minor’s best
interests, health, and welfare when she is confronted with an unwanted pregnancy
resulting from sexual assault or incest. Because it is unlikely that the states
advocating for strict abortion legislation will amend laws prohibiting abortion even in
the most dire of circumstances, it is ultimately up to Congress to provide recourse in
the form of nationwide legislation either requiring states to have sexual assault and
incest exceptions in state laws or, in the alternative, prohibiting states from excluding
these exceptions.
This Comment argues that Congress can, and should, formulate legislation
enforceable under the Commerce Clause to address stringent abortion regulations.
This could be done by zeroing in on the interstate economic activity inherent in the
rearing of unwanted children and the adverse effects on foster care and family
support.18 Preferably, federal legislation should require every state to include sexual
assault and incest exceptions in its abortion regulatory scheme. Under this theory,
states aiming to enforce severe abortion regulations would be required to modify state
laws to reflect the need for these exceptions, with such exercise of federal legislative
power justified by the deleterious economic effects of forcing minors to proceed with
unwanted pregnancies resulting from sexual assault and incest. Those who would
derive the most benefit from a congressionally mandated inclusion of sexual assault
and incest exceptions are sexual assault and incest survivors impregnated by their
assailants. Others who would benefit are those expected to care for the resultant
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

See Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 289 (1988).
Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens Patriae
Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 177 (1985).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). “Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s wellbeing, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating
or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways.” Id.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
Steven Friedland, The Rhetoric of Juvenile Rights, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 139 (1995) (quoting Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
See Kepfield, supra note 9, at 96.
Pooja Lakshmin, Rape, Pregnancy, and Mental Health: What the Politics Ignores, MEDSCAPE (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/918068.
Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 600–01 (1993) (discussing the devastating effects of teenage pregnancy on minors).
See Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might Be Tempted to Embrace
Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV . 301, 301–02 (2006).
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children, such as the minor’s family or a state-funded foster care agency, many of
which are already operating at full capacity and are largely subsidized by taxpayers’
dollars.19 Communities as a whole can avoid the economic repercussions of raising
children born as products of sexual assault and incest, and those children can avoid
the repercussions—emotional and otherwise—of being born under the trauma
triggered by such circumstances.20
Part I of this Comment discusses the State’s interest and duty under parens
patriae and how states have historically interpreted the extent of authority granted
under this doctrine. This Part explores the evolution of the doctrine, how our
jurisprudence has fashioned the scope of its application, and the limitations imposed
on its application by our Constitution. This Part also addresses states’ arguments
against abortion in the context of the doctrine and the means by which states use
their power pursuant to the doctrine to justify stringent abortion regulations for the
sake of preventing harm to the unborn fetus.21
Next, Part II delves into the history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
abortion regulations since Roe v. Wade, focusing on the development of the undue
burden standard, its intended function as a legislative drafting guideline, and how
states have broadly interpreted their authority subject to this standard for the
purpose of controlling access to abortion.22 This Part analyzes the minor’s right to
abortion and discusses that right through the lens of arguments supporting judicial
bypass and parental consent/notification statutes.23 Part II also discusses the
validity of state-enacted heartbeat bills and why the doctrine of stare decisis cannot
be relied upon to prevent the Supreme Court from abandoning the position it
established in Roe.
Part III argues that Congress, through its power under the Commerce Clause,
should act to protect minors from stringent state abortion regulations that exclude
sexual assault and incest by placing a nationwide ban on damaging state legislation,
or in the alternative, forcing states to include exceptions in their statutory schemes.
This Part lays out arguments for the inclusion of these exceptions, and discusses why
they were traditionally upheld as valid exceptions to abortion laws.24 This Part also
explores Commerce Clause jurisprudence and analyzes inconsistencies in the
Supreme Court’s adjudication of congressional plenary authority to regulate economic
activity.25 This analysis suggests that a judicial interpretation of congressional
authority can and should extend to encompass laws that affect the economic wellbeing of minors forced to parent children.
Finally, Part III(D) discusses the potential implications of the argument
proposed in Part III(C). This Section serves to emphasize the benefit derived from
legislation mandating the inclusion of exceptions. The proposed legislation will
remove the burden placed on sexual assault and incest survivors impregnated by
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 788–90 (2000); Schmidt, supra note 17, at
600–01.
Buss, supra note 19, at 788–90.
Kepfield, supra note 9, at 96 (citing Joyce Lind Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the
Government Intervene?, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61 (1990); Ellen L. Townsend, Note, Maternal Drug Use During
Pregnancy as Child Neglect or Abuse, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 1083 (1991)).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–79 (1992) (discussing the undue burden
standard); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973) (discussing viability and the trimester system).
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
Mary Ziegler, The End of the Rape and Incest Exception, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/abortion-rape-incest-exception.html.
See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 302–03.
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their assailants to care for the resultant children while reducing the number of
children suffering the repercussions of having been born out of acts of sexual
violence.26
I. THE STATE INTEREST UNDER THE PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
Parens patriae, which literally translates to mean “parent of the country,”27 is
“derive[d] from English common law, linked to the idea that the King has the right to
intervene in the biological family on behalf of the child.”28 While the Crown’s
authority pursuant to the doctrine was initially limited to the protection of children
and incompetents, “parens patriae later evolved into a ‘sweeping common-law theory
of Prerogative Regis’ whereby the king had broad authority to regulate and control
‘almost everything’ that happened within his jurisdiction.”29 “During the 19th
century, courts in the United States resorted to the doctrine in upholding early
versions of child neglect and juvenile delinquency statutes and compulsory education
laws.”30
However, as American courts adopted the doctrine, its application continued to
evolve into an all-encompassing code lacking well-defined borders31 and was, for the
most part, “unaccompanied by any meaningful constitutional scrutiny.”32 Scholars
have noted that the “expansion of parens patriae occurred ‘incrementally and almost
stealthily,’ and that the body of law was, for a time, a ‘precedential miasma.’”33
Accordingly, “for much of its history as part of American jurisprudence, the
boundaries and appropriate uses of parens patriae have been poorly defined” by
courts.34 It was not until the twentieth century that the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that the State’s assertion of its “parens patriae power in traditional family
matters, such as education and child labor, implicated constitutionally protected
interests.”35
This Part serves as a discussion of the state’s authority pursuant to the parens
patriae doctrine, distinguishing between instances where the state’s authority to
intervene has been upheld as valid and instances where that authority has been
curtailed. This Part also examines the ways in which a state legislature has the
potential to intercede on behalf of the fetus under the guise of its parens patriae duty
to protect the welfare of the state’s youth.
A. Parens Patriae: Why and When the State Steps In
Within the context of the duty to protect minors, the State’s parens patriae
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

See Buss, supra note 19, at 789–91.
John B. Hoke, Parens Patriae: A Flawed Strategy for State-Initiated Obesity Litigation, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1753, 1759 (2013).
Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, Note, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of Parens Patriae and
Parents’ Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137, 149 n.94 (2004).
Hoke, supra note 27, at 1759 (quoting Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850
(2000)).
Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 52 (2007).
Hoke, supra note 27, at 1759.
Thomas, supra note 30, at 52–53.
Hoke, supra note 27, at 1759 (quoting Ratliff, supra note 29, at 1850, 1852).
Id.
Thomas, supra note 30, at 53.
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power over children has traditionally been justified by the presumption that children
“cannot act in [their] own best interest[s] due to incapacity and immaturity.36
However, by acknowledging that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State,”37
the Supreme Court has formally recognized the State’s duty to intervene “only upon a
showing that such authority is necessary” when the child’s parent or custodian has
demonstrated that they are “unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for the child.”38 In
Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
state statute prohibiting a Jehovah’s Witness from furnishing her nine-year-old niece,
over whom she was granted custody, with magazines to be sold on the street—an
activity violative of the state’s child labor policies.39 The Court held that the “lawful
exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community,” while a suitable
undertaking for adults, created situations “wholly inappropriate for children” in light
of the “crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the
possible harms arising from . . . activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
street.”40
The Court stressed that the State’s parens patriae duty to intercede was subject
to the guardian’s claim to authority in their own household and in the rearing of
children under their care.41 Despite this limitation, however, the Court made it clear
that a statute “appropriately designed to reach [the] evils” of employing a child in a
public milieu was within the state’s police power.42 By barring the child’s potential
exposure to danger, the state’s power would operate to further the general interest of
the child’s well-being.43 Because the state’s duty to intercede is limited by the
presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interests of their child,44 intervention is
appropriate only when the parent’s decisions or conduct cause actual harm or the
imminent risk of harm to the child.45 Accordingly, the state’s duty pursuant to its
parens patriae authority is limited by the state’s obligation to further the best
interests of the minor when the parent is unable to fill that role.46
But just as the state interest can be curtailed, so, too, can the parental
interest.47 The Court’s opinion in Prince emphasized that “basic in a democracy, stand
the interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the state’s assertion of
authority to that end . . . is valid.”48 The Court opined it is ultimately in “the interest
of . . . the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well36

37
38
39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State’s Parens Patriae Authority and
Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED.
283, 290 (1991).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
Griffith, supra note 36, at 290.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160 (1944). Sarah Prince, the appellant and a Jehovah’s Witness,
predicated her argument on the First Amendment’s Religious Freedom Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 161, 164.
Id. at 168–70.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 169.
See id. at 166.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000).
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, No Way to Treat a Woman: Creating an Appropriate Standard for Resolving Medical
Treatment Disputes Involving HIV-Positive Children, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 251 (2002).
Griffith, supra note 36, at 290.
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
Id.
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developed . . . citizens.”49 Thus, the state’s authority over a child’s activities is broader
than its authority over adult activities because “[a] democratic society rests . . . upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into” fully mature and productive
citizens.50 As such, “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well-being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways.”51 The
Court thus conceded that, for the purposes of protecting the child and promoting the
community’s derived benefit from the child’s growth into a productive adult,52 “the
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority” over
activities adversely impacting the child’s welfare.53
B. Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention
It is a well-established principle that “freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is one of the fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”54 That freedom encompasses “the decision to
marry, use contraceptives,” and, most importantly, the “freedom of a parent and child
to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relationship.”55 As the Supreme Court
stated in Prince, “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.”56
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Prince acknowledged that the State has a
compelling interest in protecting children under the parens patriae doctrine, but this
is not an interest that remains unchecked.57 Just as the Supreme Court has
recognized the State’s power pursuant to its interest in securing the well-being of its
youth, the Court has duly recognized constitutional safeguards established to prevent
the State from impinging on the parent’s right to foster a relationship with their child
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 It is “only when the
state has evidence that the parent is unfit [that] the fundamental right of a parent
falters under the Constitution.”59 Accordingly, when the State acts to impinge on this
right, it will be required to prove that its action of intervening in the privacy of the
family is in the best interests of the child.60
One of the first Supreme Court cases to address the parent’s rights pursuant to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was Meyer v. Nebraska.61 In
49
50
51
52

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 166.
The state’s authority is not invalidated “merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s
course of conduct on religion or conscience.” Id. at 166. The parent “cannot claim freedom from compulsory
vaccination for the child . . . on religious grounds.” Id. “The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” Id. at
166–67.
Id. at 167.
Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Poverty Alone,
70 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 450 (1997).
Id. (quoting Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Id. (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
Wilkinson-Hagen, supra note 28, at 149.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Meyer, the appellant was a German language teacher who was convicted for violating
a Nebraska law barring citizens from teaching a foreign language to children who had
yet to pass the eighth grade.62 On appeal, the Supreme Court was tasked with
evaluating whether Nebraska’s statute infringed upon the appellant’s right to due
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment—that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”63 In holding that
the statute was violative of the appellant’s substantive right to due process, the Court
stated that “liberty may not be interfered with, [even] under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”64 The Court
thus held that the Nebraska law was unconstitutional because it infringed on the
liberty interest of the parents of the students by limiting their right to direct the
education and upbringing of their children.65 In recognizing that a due process
violation occurs when the State enacts a law that infringes upon the parent’s right to
enforce upon their children a knowledge of a language other than English, the Court
established that a state could only go so far in its enforcement of legislation subject to
constitutional restraints imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.66
The Supreme Court’s view in Meyer was reiterated two years later in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.67 In Pierce, the State of Oregon appealed an order enjoining the
state from threatening or attempting to enforce the Compulsory Education Act, a law
ordering parents and guardians to send their children aged eight to sixteen to a public
school in the district where the child resided.68 The appellees, two private education
institutions, alleged that the Act restricted parents from choosing where their
children would go to school.69 Consistent with its opinion in Meyer, the Supreme
Court held that the Act “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”70 It
was here that the Court recognized that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State” and that “those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”71 The
parents’ right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs and values is,
thus, one that is constitutionally enshrined.72 However, as established in Prince, state
interference is nonetheless permissible where a child’s maturation into a productive
and contributing member of society is materially hindered.73
62
63
64
65
66

67
68
69

70
71
72
73

Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 400.
See id. “Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws.” Id.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 531–34. Suits were brought by Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, both private Oregon
corporations that administered education to children between the ages of eight and sixteen. Id. Both of the
appellees’ suits were initially precipitated by their respective businesses’ profit loss as a consequence of the
statute’s enforcement. Id.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
See id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
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C. The “State’s Interest” Argument
Ensuring that children mature into productive members of society that will
ultimately contribute to a robust economy is consistent with government “interest in
maintaining a steady population, because such constancy [in population] promotes
economic stability and growth.”74 In other words, both goals serve the same purpose.
“In arguing for the constitutionality of various limitations on abortions, states have
long argued that a [number of compelling] state interests apply,” most of which are
driven by similar economic goals.75 Such interests “include protecting potential life,
promoting child birth, and the [overall] promotion of life and dignity generally.”76 In
the context of abortion, fetal rights advocates have asserted that state intervention to
protect the fetus is legally justifiable because it is an exercise of traditional state
police powers as lawfully applied under parens patriae authority.77 In fact, this is “the
most common legal rationale” and, consequently, the foundational argument “for state
intervention on behalf of the fetus.”78
Relying on Mormon Church v. United States, one of the earliest United States
cases to address the State’s parens patriae authority, fetal rights advocates have
asserted that the Supreme Court exceeds its jurisdiction when imposing limits on the
State’s power to extend its interest to encapsulate the protection of fetal life.79 In
Mormon Church, the Court endorsed an expansive interpretation of the parens
patriae power when it held that the doctrine “is inherent in the supreme power of
every State . . . [as a] most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves.”80 For the purpose of preventing injury to “those who cannot protect
themselves,” fetal rights advocates have reasoned that the State’s interest in
protecting the fetus is necessarily implicated by virtue of its defenseless nature.81
Accordingly, “[i]f the state has the authority to intervene on behalf of [older children
who are] comparatively autonomous, state action on behalf of the unborn is even
more justifiable” under this theory.82
The question, then, is to what extent does fetal protection allow for the State’s
interference? Similar to how parents’ right to familial privacy in the realm of childrearing is balanced against the State’s right to intrude pursuant to its police powers,
the concept of fetal rights—and whatever right the state has within this sphere—
naturally implicates the rights of pregnant women to bodily autonomy.83 The
Supreme Court has formally “recognized the ‘sacred’ and ‘carefully guarded’ right to
exercise control over one’s body[,] [and] [t]his right has since been invoked in various
contexts to protect individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusions.”84
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Meghan Boone, Reproductive Due Process, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 531 (2020).
Id. at 530.
Id.
Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D. Snyder, Women’s Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal
Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 100 (2000).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 101–02.
Id. (quoting Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
Id. at 102 (quoting Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 57).
Id.
See Shanon K. Such, Lifesaving Medical Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus: Limitations on State Authority
Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 973 (1986).
Id. at 970 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). “[P]ersons suspected of criminal
activity may refuse to have their stomachs pumped. Adult patients or their guardians may refuse blood
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This protection has also afforded women control over the way they manage
their pregnancies, regardless of whether their choices culminate in termination of
fetal life—for example, refusal to undergo medical treatment purported to save or
preserve the life of the fetus.85 However, “not all such intrusions by the state are
constitutionally barred,” as some courts have permitted “bodily intrusion[] where [it
was believed to] further[] a compelling state interest.”86 Because courts apply a
balancing test to determine “whether the state can intrude on a person’s right to
bodily integrity,” the state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus is weighed
against any infringement on the pregnant woman’s right to privacy in her own body.87
And in cases in which the state’s interest is deemed sufficiently legitimate, the state
may intercede.88 Having established that the state’s authority affords it the right to
intervene where a legitimate interest is implicated, Part II’s discussion below shifts
the focus to what that interest looks like in the context of abortion regulations and
reproductive rights.
II. ABORTION RIGHTS AND MINORS’ ACCESS TO THOSE RIGHTS
There are only a few areas of this country’s legislation that have managed to
generate the level of heated public scrutiny and zealous outrage that abortion law has
triggered during the past fifty years. As fraught with controversy as it is brief,
abortion jurisprudence has consistently been determinative of the degree of division
inherent in our political culture and the degree to which we allow a religious
framework to dictate that culture. As one scholar noted, “[a]bortion is an issue so
charged with emotion that it is probably the most misrepresented subject in the
history of Anglo- American law.”89
“The practice of abortion was [fairly] common throughout history,” as records
dating back to the Roman Empire “show that the Romans relied on the juice of the
now extinct silphium plant to induce abortions.”90 “[T]he common law afforded women
the right to have an abortion” in England between the fourteenth and nineteenth
centuries and in the United States between the seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries.91 In cases in which an abortion resulted from acts of violence perpetrated
against a pregnant woman, courts were reluctant to criminally convict the offender by
characterizing such acts as felonious.92 This was the fundamental argument in favor
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transfusions, amputations, continued life support intervention and other medical treatment on the basis of
their protected interest in bodily integrity.” Id. at 970–71.
Id. at 971. In Taft v. Taft, “the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated a lower court’s judgment
ordering a surgical procedure necessary to save the life of a sixteen-week-old fetus.” Id. at 966–67. “The court
stated that the woman’s privacy and religious interests were ‘established on the record’ and that the
‘circumstances’ of the case were not sufficiently compelling to outweigh her constitutional rights.” Id. at 967
(quoting Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983)).
Id. at 971. For example, courts have upheld “regulations establishing mandatory vaccinations against
contagious disease in the interest of public health and safety.” Id.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 973. Goals that the courts have recognized as legitimate in medical treatment cases include those that
further the state’s interests in protecting life and health. See id.
Sybil Shainwald, Reproductive Injustice in the New Millennium, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 123, 124
(2013).
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. “(1) ‘The Twinslayer’s Case’ . . . involved a defendant who had beaten a woman in an advanced stage of
pregnancy, terminating her pregnancy with twins . . . .; (2) ‘The Abortionist’s Case’ . . . involved a defendant
who was indicted for killing a child in a mother’s womb, but was not convicted because of the difficulty in
proving his responsibility for the death.” Id.
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of not criminalizing abortion, thus waiving a need for courts to definitively determine
issues of legality.93
The question of whether the fetus becomes a person while inside the womb was
germane to court decisions from as early as the thirteenth century.94 Some legal
critics and judges believed that
because an unborn child was not a person in rerum natura,95 its death should not be
characterized as a homicide.96 Henry de Bracton, an English jurist in the midthirteenth century, however, maintained that homicide had been committed where
someone “[hit] a pregnant woman or g[ave] her poison in order to procure an abortion,
if the foetus [was] already formed or quickened, especially if it [was] quickened.”97 The
term quicken was used to identify the point at which the fetus had a soul and was
generally synonymous with the moment at which some form of fetal movement could
be detected.98
Abortion did not become a felony in England until 1803, and prosecution for
abortion in the United States remained nearly nonexistent until 1821, when
Connecticut became the first state to ban post-quickening abortions.99 Missouri,
Illinois, and New York adopted anti-abortion legislation similar to the Connecticut
statute in the following decade.100 “During the anti-abortion movement of the midnineteenth century, more states introduced statutes that made abortion illegal at all
stages of pregnancy.”101 This was largely due to a growing awareness that existing
abortion procedures posed grave risks to the life and health of the mother,102 coupled
with the propagation of literature supporting the theory that a fetus is a living person
from the moment of conception.103
Anti-abortion legislation was firmly ingrained in American law by the early
twentieth century.104 Abortion was outlawed in every state except for Kentucky by
1910, and it was classified as a felony offense in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia until 1967.105 The possibility of facing grave consequences was a risk
assumed by anyone who violated these laws, with physicians facing the harshest
penalties, such as “losing their licenses to practice and facing criminal charges.”106
States did, however, recognize the need for exceptions where pregnancies posed a
93
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See id.
Id.
“In the nature of things; in existence.” In rerum natura, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Shainwald, supra note 89, at 128. These views had been expressed in the writings of Sir William Staunford
(1509–1558), a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and William Lambarde (1536–1601), a legal critic. Id.
Id. at 127. (alteration in original) (quoting the writings of Henry de Bracton, an English jurist in the midthirteenth century).
Id. at 128. “The doctrine of quickening was originally developed by St. Thomas Aquinas in the twelfth
century.” Id. “Aquinas taught that the fetus did not have a soul until the point of quickening, that fetal
movement should be used to differentiate between pregnancy stages, and that abortion prior to this point was
not the same as killing a person.” Id. at 128–29.
See id. at 130–31. “[T]he first reported abortion cases took place in Massachusetts in 1812.” Id. at 131. “[T]he
Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the charges when the prosecution failed to prove that the woman had
quickened.” Id.
Id.
Id. at 136.
See id. at 132–33. “[D]anger of infection and death due to the lack of antiseptic procedures” triggered
widespread safety concerns. See id. at 124. “Abortions performed in New York as late as 1884, by competent
physicians during the early stages of pregnancy, were ten to fifteen times more dangerous than childbirth.” Id.
at 134.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 141.
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severe health risk.107 Thus, abortions were permitted under “therapeutic” exception
provisions and were most commonly invoked when necessary to save the life of the
mother.108
Abortions began to receive greater attention during the 1950s when health
organizations, medical professionals, and scholars observed that abortion procedure
rates were still high, despite their illegality.109 Moreover, improper procedures used in
many illegal abortions continued to raise issues of public health that needed to be
addressed.110 However, the 1950s also saw a surge in medical advances that
drastically reduced the dangers that initially sparked the nineteenth-century abortion
ban.111 By 1955, “[w]ith the combined effects of improved medical techniques,
analgesics, antibiotics, and antiseptics,” abortions were deemed “safer than delivering
a child.”112 Because abortions were inherently dangerous prior to the advent of these
medical advances, resorting to the practice was formerly considered to have been done
out of desperation.113 It was these medical advances that “‘precipitated . . . a deep
culture-wide debate on abortion’” because, for the first time, women were given a
choice.114
Part II is a discussion of the ways in which a woman’s right to choose was
adopted by states, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of that choice as a
substantive Fourteenth Amendment due process right, and how the Court’s
jurisprudence has shaped and extended that right to include access to minors.
A. The Evolution of Abortion Jurisprudence
The American Law Institute published its Model Penal Code in 1962.115
Included in the code was an abortion statute in which justifiable reasons for obtaining
an abortion were extended to cover “the risk of grave impairment to the mother’s
physical or mental health, the risk of bearing a child with a grave physical or mental
defect, and pregnancy resulting from” sexual assault and incest.116 From 1966
through 1972, thirteen states amended their abortion statutes in accordance with the
recommendation endorsed by the American Law Institute’s code, with “Alaska,
Hawaii, New York, and Washington repeal[ing] their abortion laws altogether.”117 The
late 1960s and early 1970s saw a flurry of reproductive rights and healthcare cases
making their way through the United States judicial system, with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut serving as the primary catalyst to spark a
stream of constitutional challenges to state regulations.118 Griswold, a 1965 case
involving a clinic that distributed contraceptives and provided birth control
counseling, threw the abortion debate into the political spotlight.119 By stressing that
107
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See id. at 138.
Id. at 139 n.155.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Shainwald, supra note 89, at 141.
See Shainwald, supra note 89, at 141. Appellant Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Appellant Buxton was a licensed physician “who served as Medical
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this case “concern[ed] a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees,” the Supreme Court essentially
opened the door for states to extend the concept of privacy to include a woman’s right
to choose.120
“By 1973, abortion statutes had been challenged on several constitutional
grounds, including vagueness, privacy, and equal protection of the laws.”121 Based on
these developments, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear two companion
cases challenging a state’s right to limit access to abortion: Roe v. Wade and Doe. v.
Bolton.122 In both cases, the Court considered challenges to state laws—Texas and
Georgia, respectively—that criminalized abortions except where the pregnancy posed
a risk to the life or health of the mother.123 In both Roe and Doe, “lower federal courts
had declared the statutes unconstitutional, holding that denying a woman the right to
decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term violated basic privacy and liberty
interests enumerated by the Constitution.”124
The Court’s landmark 7–2 decision in Roe upheld a woman’s fundamental right
to terminate her pregnancy as one that was constitutionally enshrined.125 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized that the right of privacy was “broad
enough” to encompass a woman’s right to choose and that the State would be
imposing a serious “detriment” upon a woman by denying her that right.126 The
majority further observed that this was especially true in cases in which neither the
woman nor society was prepared to deal with the repercussions of being forced to
raise an unwanted child:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her
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Director for the League at its Center in New Haven.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. Both Appellants were
arrested for “[giving] information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of
preventing conception.” Id. (emphasis in original).
See Shainwald, supra note 89, at 141–42 (alteration in original) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). The
California Supreme Court incorporated the privacy doctrine in its decision in People v. Belous, where it held
that “[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children follow[ed] from the Supreme
Court’s . . . acknowledgment of a ‘right of privacy’ or ‘liberty’ in matters related to marriage, family, and sex.”
458 P.2d 194, 199–200 (Cal. 1969) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86, 500); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1,
12, 87 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17,
19 (Cal. 1948)).
Shainwald, supra note 89, at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
Id. at 153. “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 153.
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responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.127
However, the Court also conceded that because the State had an “important
and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the . . . woman” and
“the potentiality of human life” inside her, a “compelling” state interest could justify
the enactment of laws limiting her right to terminate her pregnancy.128
According to the Court, fetal viability aptly determined the point at which a
state’s legitimate concern for the safety of the mother and fetus rose to a “compelling”
level such that interference with a woman’s pregnancy could be justified.129 Because
the fetus “presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb” at the point of viability, state regulations protective of fetal life after this point
would be valid on “both logical and biological” grounds.130 A woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy was thus subject to restraints substantiated by the
“established medical fact . . . that until the end of the first trimester mortality in
abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.”131
In accordance with these restraints, the Court devised the trimester
framework: a system in which a woman’s right to access abortion was governed by
how far along she was in her pregnancy.132 This system established the trimester in
which a woman could undergo an abortion, absent state intervention to regulate her
decision, based on the fetus’ viability and the corresponding state interest in
preserving the health and life of both the mother and fetus.133 If a woman wished to
undergo the procedure prior to the end of the first trimester, her right to do so
generally remained free from state interference.134 If she wished to undergo the
procedure during the second trimester, the state was permitted to intercede to the
extent that a state-enforced regulation was reasonably related to the “preservation
and protection of maternal health.”135 And if she wished to undergo the procedure
after the end of the second trimester, the point at which the fetus was deemed viable,
the state was permitted to proscribe the procedure altogether unless the mother’s
health or life were at risk.136
In Doe, the same seven-justice majority echoed its opinion in Roe by concluding
that “state regulations that create[d] procedural obstacles to abortion, such as the
requirement that an abortion be performed in a hospital or be approved by two
doctors, violated a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.”137 But there, as in Roe,
the Court reinforced its position that a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy was not absolute.138 Consequently, in the years immediately following Roe,
the Court’s somewhat malleable stance implicitly gave states permission to
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Id.
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 163. A fetus was deemed viable at around the six-to-seven-month mark, or approximately twenty-four to
twenty-eight weeks. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as “to the qualifications of the
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the
procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of
less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.” Id.
Id. at 163–64.
Shainwald, supra note 89, at 148.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).
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circumvent the case’s holding and create new barriers to abortion access such as
requiring “parental consent, spousal consent, and waiting periods for women seeking
abortions.”139
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey was one such case.
In Casey, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law
requiring a woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent, wait twenty-four
hours, and, if married, obtain the consent of her spouse before undergoing the
procedure.140 The law also mandated that minors obtain the informed consent of at
least one parent, though judicial bypass remained available as an alternative
option.141 In maintaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protected a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, the Court’s 5-4 decision
reaffirmed the constitutional framework that was dispositive of its conclusion in
Roe.142 While Casey’s holding was largely predicated on stare decisis,143 the Court
rejected Roe’s trimester framework on the grounds that it was “incompatible with the
recognition [of] a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”144
This approach, the Court stressed, contradicted the assumption of a valid state
interest in protecting fetal life by rendering any intervention prior to the point of
viability unwarranted.145 The Court thus introduced a new standard to be applied
when assessing the constitutionality of state laws that functioned as barriers to
abortion access: the undue burden test.146
Under the Court’s novel scheme, state laws designed to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion passed constitutional muster so long as they did not
impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy prior to the
point of fetal viability.147 In delineating the scope of an undue burden, the Court held
that a state regulation imposing “a substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability was invalid on the grounds that it
furthered the state’s interest in potential life by hindering a woman’s free choice.148
To that end, laws that would “do no more than create a structural mechanism by
which [a] state . . . [could] express profound respect for the life of the unborn” were
accordingly valid absent a showing of unnecessary interference with the woman’s
right to exercise her freedom to choose.149 In holding that the spousal notification
requirement imposed an undue burden, whereas the informed consent requirement
and the twenty-four hour waiting period did not, the Court’s opinion offered examples
of “slight” impediments that would all but fail to amount to a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion.150 Restrictions that would “merely make[]
abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain” or “increase[] the cost of some
139
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Shainwald, supra note 89, at 149.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
Id. Judicial bypass is a method of bypassing the requisite parental or guardian involvement in a minor’s
decision to undergo an abortion by receiving permission from a court. Wendy-Adele Humphrey, Two-Stepping
Around a Minor's Constitutional Right to Abortion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1769, 1773 (2017).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 876, 878.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876–77.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 877.
Marlow Svatek, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Why Courts Should Consider Cumulative Effects in the Undue
Burden Analysis, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 121, 124 (2017).
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abortions by a slight amount” would not constitute an undue burden, but “at some
point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle.”151 The scheme’s latitude
and lack of specified guidance as to what did constitute an undue burden thus left
open the door for federal appellate courts to articulate the standard through a free
lens and for states to adopt a loose interpretation of the standard for the purpose of
fashioning abortion legislation.152
B. Minors’ Access to Abortion and the Law
At the forefront of the abortion debate rests the contention that a parent’s
involvement over a minor’s decision to access abortion should be state mandated.153 In
fact, in many states, a minor’s choice to terminate her pregnancy does require one of
two forms of parental control: consent or notification.154 “Parental consent laws
require a pregnant minor to obtain the consent, usually written, of at least one parent
or custodial guardian prior to undergoing an abortion procedure.”155 Parental
notification laws do not require parental or custodial consent but instead demand that
a “pregnant minor . . . notify at least one parent or custodial guardian of her intention
to undergo an abortion prior to the procedure.”156
The tension between the rights of minors and the rights of parents or
custodians has shaped the development of adolescent abortion jurisprudence for
nearly fifty years.157 Three years after deciding Roe, “the Supreme Court first
addressed the constitutionality of state-mandated parental consent [requirements] for
unmarried pregnant minors in [the seminal case] Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth.”158 In Danforth, the Court invalidated a Missouri law requiring
unmarried pregnant minors to seek written parental consent before obtaining an
abortion on the grounds that it violated the trimester framework established in
Roe.159 In an opinion consistent with Roe, the Court held that the state did “not have
the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over the [woman’s] decision . . . to terminate [her] pregnancy” during the first
trimester.160 And because “[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights,” a woman’s right to decide the fate of
her pregnancy does not “mature and come into being magically only when [she]
attains the state-defined age of majority.”161
The Court’s opinion in Danforth was echoed three years later in Bellotti v.
Baird when it invalidated a Massachusetts law requiring a pregnant minor to obtain
parental consent or, in the alternative, parental notification prior to seeking judicial
permission to undergo an abortion.162 Because it was conceivable that a parent
beholden to their own views on abortion would make reasonable efforts to obstruct or
151
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Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94, 901).
Id. at 121, 124.
See Amanda M. Lanham, Note, Parental Notification Under the Undue Burden Standard: Is a Bypass
Mechanism Required?, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 551, 551 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 551.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
Id.
Lanham, supra note 153, at 555.

274

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[10:257

altogether prevent their daughter’s access to the judicial system, thus placing an
undue burden on her right to obtain an abortion, the Court conceded that “[i]t would
be unrealistic . . . to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to seek [judicial]
relief” would adequately offer the relief sought by those who would “need it most.”163
The Court articulated, in dicta, the criteria for a constitutional judicial bypass
provision as an alternative to parental consent:
(1) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes
that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make the
abortion decision independently; (2) allow the minor to bypass the
consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her
best interests; (3) ensure the minor’s anonymity; and (4) provide for
expeditious bypass procedures.164
However, consistent with its opinion in Prince, the Court’s plurality opinion in
Bellotti maintained that “the State [was] entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for [a child’s] vulnerability.”165 The State’s power to “limit the freedom of children to
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices . . . [has] been
grounded in the recognition that . . . minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”166
Accordingly, “[a]s immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences,” a state
may impinge on the minor’s freedom to circumvent parental consultation prior to
obtaining judicial permission if doing so would promote “the best interest of the
minor.”167 Thus, the minor’s “best interest” and the State’s authority to act as an
agent in pursuit and protection of those interests became critical to the Court’s
evaluation of a minor’s autonomous decision-making as balanced against a state’s
intervention.168
The Court’s discussion of the minor’s best interest was characterized by an indepth consideration of the injurious impact on the minor when compelled to carry an
unwanted pregnancy to full-term:
[T]he potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman . . . is not
mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity,
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In
addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal
responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is
one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities
of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor
the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave
and indelible.169
With these considerations in mind, the Court drew on an appreciation for the
wide range of circumstances in which the minor’s decision to undergo an abortion
163
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would undoubtedly vary.170 Where marrying the child’s father, putting the child up for
adoption, or taking on motherhood with the solidarity of family remained practical
alternatives, the choice to carry to full term could be made in accordance with the best
interests of the minor.171 However, where the minor was unable to access, and thus
benefit from, these options, her best interests were served by choosing to terminate
the pregnancy rather than bear the consequences of having a child whom she was illprepared to raise.172 Nonetheless, the Court pointed to an “important state interest in
encouraging a family” that a reviewing court could take into account when called
upon to determine whether abortion was in fact in a minor’s best interests.173
Eleven years later, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and
Hodgson v. Minnesota, the Court was tasked with assessing the constitutional
validity of the judicial bypass provision requirements articulated in Bellotti.174 In
Akron, the Court upheld Ohio’s judicial bypass procedure, which the state required as
an alternative to parental notification statutes, as valid on the grounds that it
satisfied the four factors enumerated in Bellotti.175 In Hodgson, the Court essentially
upheld a Minnesota statute requiring a pregnant minor to notify both parents of her
intent to undergo an abortion on the grounds that the statute’s judicial bypass
provision negated the damaging effects conferred on a minor and her family by the
two-parent notification requirement.176 Though the two-parent notification
requirement was rendered unconstitutional on the grounds that it “[did] not
reasonably further any legitimate state interest,”177 Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion stressed that the state’s judicial bypass provision effectively removed the
statute’s constitutional defects.178 The judicial bypass provision thus passed muster
on the grounds that “interference with the internal operation of the family required
by [the two-parent notification provision] simply [did] not exist where the minor
[could] avoid notifying one or both parents by use of the bypass procedure.”179
While judicial bypass has since been recognized as a viable alternative to
consent or notification requirements, its procedural shortcomings have not gone
unnoticed. The length of the judicial process, from initiating proceedings to awaiting a
judge’s decision, can cause substantial delays that ultimately render the procedure
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Id.
Id. at 642–43.
See id.
Id. at 648.
If, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor’s best interests,
she is entitled to court authorization without any parental involvement. On the other hand, the
court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the absence of parental
consultation if it concludes that her best interests would be served thereby, or the court may in
such a case defer decision until there is parental consultation in which the court may participate.
But this is the full extent to which parental involvement may be required.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990).
Id. at 511.
Lanham, supra note 153, at 559–60.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990). The Court emphasized that the state did not rely on the best
interests of the minor in defending the two-parent notification requirement. Id. at 451. Instead, the state
argue[d] that, in the ideal family, the minor should make her decision only after consultation
with both parents who should naturally be concerned with the child’s welfare and that the
State has an interest in protecting the independent right of the parents ‘to determine and
strive for what they believe to be best for their children.’
Id. at 451–52.
Lanham, supra note 153, at 560.
Id. (quoting Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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unobtainable as the pregnancy advances: the procedure becomes risky, its costs
increase, and physicians become less willing to provide the service.180 Moreover,
young women who, for a number of conceivable reasons, are unable to depend on their
parents or guardians for emotional or financial support find little relief in reluctantly
revealing the intimate “details of their private lives” to judges, thus fundamentally
reducing the option’s potential to succeed as an adequate alternative.181
The option’s ineffectiveness is even more pronounced where the minor’s
pregnancy is a product of sexual assault or incest. In early 2019, Massachusetts
lawmakers considered adopting the ROE Act182—legislation that would scrap the
state’s parental consent statute altogether—partially for this reason.183 “The ROE Act
. . . would reform [Massachusetts’s] abortion laws, ensuring that anyone, regardless of
age, income, or insurance, can access safe, legal abortion.”184 Recognizing that
disclosing an unintended pregnancy could place minors at risk of physical or
emotional violence in their homes, especially where the pregnancy resulted from an
act of incest or sexual violence perpetrated by someone close to the family, the ROE
Act serves to protect abortion access for young people and remove a number of
barriers to abortion access, including the judicial bypass system.185
If passed, the ROE Act would group Massachusetts alongside twelve other
states and the District of Columbia that, as of August 2020, allow women under the
age of eighteen to obtain an abortion without first obtaining consent or notification
from either one or both parents.186 Of the states that continue to require parental
involvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion, twenty-one states require
parental consent while six states require both parental notification and consent.187
Thirty-seven states that require parental involvement in some capacity provide
judicial bypass as an alternative option to minors seeking abortions.188 While thirtyfive states that require any degree of parental involvement provide exceptions for
medical emergencies, only sixteen states permit a minor to obtain an abortion without
parental involvement in cases of abuse, assault, incest, or neglect.189 Thus, in the
180
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Laws Restricting Teenagers’ Access to Abortion, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/lawsrestricting-teenagers-access-abortion (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
Id.
S. 1209, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019).
See Martha Bebinger, Massachusetts May Drop Requirement that Minors Get Permission for Abortion, NPR
(Jan. 2, 2020, 7:20 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/01/02/789966125/massachusetts-maydrop-requirement-that-minors-get-permission-for-abortion. A fifteen-year-old woman from Massachusetts
whose pregnancy was the product of sexual assault relied on the state’s judicial bypass law as a means of
terminating her pregnancy. Id. Because the assailant was a “family friend,” disclosing the pregnancy to her
family offered neither a “safe” nor “healthy” solution at the time. Id. The judge issued an order granting her
request, but the additional time it took to get that permission pushed the minor past the point that would
allow her to take pills to induce an abortion, thus compelling her to undergo a risky and invasive surgery. Id.
Expanding Abortion Access: The ROE Act, NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS.,
https://prochoicemass.org/issue/expanding-abortion-access/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210118012750/https://prochoicemass.org/issue/expanding-abortion-access/].
Teen Access, NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS., https://prochoicemass.org/issue/teen-access/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2021). [https://web.archive.org/web/20210118005136/https://prochoicemass.org/issue/teen-access/].
Parental Consent and Notification Laws, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED’N AM.,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/teens/stds-birth-control-pregnancy/parental-consent-andnotification-laws (last updated Aug. 2020). States that allow minors access to abortion absent parental
involvement are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. See id.
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions (last updated Sept. 1, 2021).
Id.
Id.
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context of state abortion laws that actively serve to protect minors from further harm
and abuse, the disparity among states is acutely felt and continues to grow.
C. The Constitutional Validity of the Heartbeat Bills
When Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 2018
solidified a predominantly conservative and pro-life majority, a number of states
rushed to enact their versions of abortion legislation specifically designed to penetrate
the core of Roe v. Wade and, ultimately, gut the past fifty years of abortion
jurisprudence.190 The “heartbeat bill” derives its name from the point during
pregnancy at which the bill mandates a near total prohibition on abortion—the stage
at which the fetal heartbeat is first detected, which is usually around six weeks into
gestation and often before a woman can confirm that she is in fact pregnant.191 But
heartbeat bills have been around for the past several years, with Ohio emerging as
the first state to introduce a heartbeat bill in 2011 at the urging of a pro-life and profamily group called Faith2Action.192
Though not signed into law, Ohio’s heartbeat bill inspired anti-abortion
legislators in states across the country to propose fetal heartbeat bills of their own,
with North Dakota succeeding as the first state to enact its version of the bill in
2013.193 The North Dakota bill was challenged in federal courts, where it was struck
down at the appellate level before being appealed to the Supreme Court.194 The
Supreme Court declined to review the case, thus upholding the lower court’s decision
to block the bill.195 Arkansas passed a similarly stringent law that same year, with
Iowa following its lead five years later in 2018.196
Both Arkansas’s and Iowa’s bans were enjoined in courts,197 and yet 2019 saw
state after state adopting bills that sought to ban abortion procedures past the point
of a fetal heartbeat detection.198 While some states like Georgia introduced bills that
included exceptions for sexual assault and incest,199 laws in Alabama, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio made no such allowances.200 As these
states joined forces in a sweeping effort to erode women’s collective constitutional
right to self-autonomy and reproductive freedom, they did so by asserting an interest
justified on the grounds of preserving life.201
190
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200
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Lemieux, supra note 7.
Anna North & Catherine Kim, The “Heartbeat” Bills that Could Ban Almost All Abortions, Explained, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/4/19/18412384/abortion-heartbeat-bill-georgia-louisiana-ohio2019 (last updated June 28, 2019, 9:50 AM).
Jessica Ravitz, Courts Say Anti-Abortion ‘Heartbeat Bills’ Are Unconstitutional. So Why Do They Keep
Coming?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/26/health/heartbeat-bills-abortion-bans-history/index.html (last
updated May 16, 2019, 9:28 AM).
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Colleen Ahern, Reproductive Rights: A Look at the Recent Legislation Passed Across the Country Aimed at
Either Limiting or Protecting the Right to Abortion Procedures, 25 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 81, 82 (2020);
Katherine Kubak, Shelby Martin, Natasha Mighell, Madison Winey & Rachel Wofford, Abortion, 20 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 265, 275 (2019).
Gordon & Hurt, supra note 8.
North & Kim, supra note 191.
Gordon & Hurt, supra note 8.
See Abigail Abrams, Here’s How Conservatives Are Using Civil Rights Law to Restrict Abortion, TIME (Jan. 1,
2020, 12:01 AM), https://time.com/5753300/heartbeat-bill-civil-rights-law/. Supporters of Georgia’s bill claimed
that a “’heartbeat’ was a sign of life and therefore personhood.” Id. Thus, “if fetuses were living, they were a

278

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[10:257

When challenged in court, these bills and similar bills that sought to ban
abortions at fifteen or even twenty weeks were struck down as unconstitutional.202 A
Fifth Circuit decision to strike down Mississippi’s fifteen-week abortion ban, for
example, rested on the Supreme Court’s holding in Roe that established viability at
twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks, thus rendering a prohibition on the procedure
prior to that time unconstitutional.203 Still, despite their flagrant unconstitutionality,
states endeavored to pass anti-abortion regulations hoping that at least one would
“stick.”204 Pro-life advocates pushing these bills—newly emboldened by optimism and
faith in the Supreme Court’s right-leaning majority—endeavored toward a specific
goal: splits among circuits would prompt the Supreme Court to revisit the issue upon
review, culminating in a departure from Roe.205
Whereas most stringent abortion regulations did not prevail past the first stage
of appellate review, there was one case that managed to gain enough traction in the
courts—and in the media— such that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear it.206 In June Medical Services v. Russo, abortion providers challenged a
Louisiana law requiring doctors who performed abortions to have admitting privileges
at nearby hospitals.207 In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, Louisiana’s
regulation was struck down as unconstitutional under precedent established in a 2016
case—Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt208—in which a nearly identical Texas
statute was challenged and subsequently struck down in violation of Casey’s undue
burden standard.209 Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion made it clear, however, that
his concurrence with the majority was not predicated on an agenda intended to
champion the reproductive rights of women;210 rather, his concurrence rested on the
tenets of stare decisis and his appreciation for the Court’s duty to maintain its
“fidelity to precedent.”211
As it stands and as can be acknowledged from the Supreme Court’s split among
justices in June Medical Services, the possibility that Roe might be overturned is not
unrealistic, especially in light of the “well-documented hostility toward abortion”
expressed by the Court’s conservative majority.212 With Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s
confirmation to the Court, the threat to women’s reproductive freedom is now as
palpable as it is imminent. If Roe and its progeny are all that stand to prevent antiabortion lawmakers and activists from enforcing their conservative agenda, and if
Roe’s fate hinges on the composition of a conservative majority, states are essentially
one Supreme Court opinion away from achieving the legislative freedom to draft and
enforce laws that can profoundly affect the lives and rights of American women for
generations to come.
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‘vulnerable’ class of people who deserve rights and protections.” Id. Accordingly, the bill’s advocates asserted
“that Georgia should be allowed to expand rights and protections to this new group as a matter of states’
rights.” Id.
See Ravitz, supra note 192.
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 951 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
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See Ahern, supra note 197, at 85.
Bridget Winkler, What About the Rule of Law? Deviation from the Principles of Stare Decisis in Abortion
Jurisprudence, and an Analysis of June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo Oral Arguments, 68 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 14, 23 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
136. S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112–13.
See id. at 2133.
Id. at 2134.
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III. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO PROTECT MINORS FROM STRINGENT
ABORTION REGULATIONS
In the twenty years since presidential candidate Ralph Nader openly opined
that the fate of abortion did not completely hinge on the liberal-to-conservative U.S.
Supreme Court justice ratio, the issue has remained ripe for discussion among
scholars in the legal community.213 If Roe were to be overturned, states would then be
in a position to assert total control over a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy.214 However, scholars have speculated that, although the power to regulate
abortion would revert to the states upon an overturning of Roe, Congress is not
completely bereft of its ability to regain control and, in fact, may be able to do so
under the Commerce Clause.215
The grant of federal legislative authority is limited to a litany of enumerated
rights or “Power[s]” as laid out per Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.216 The
Commerce Clause refers to one such power that bestows upon the federal government
the authority to regulate matters affecting commercial activity among the states.217
Where the exercise of state power is concerned, the Commerce Clause has consistently
presented a challenge to the states’ exertion of authority over a variety of matters
“ranging from interstate shipping rates to restaurants to employment contracts.”218
Since its adoption, however, the Commerce Clause has also “become one of Congress’s
most significant sources of power” and the foundation for congressional authority over
all economic-related activity.219
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has elicited a remarkably wide spectrum of
constitutional interpretive theory that remains subject to an understanding of activity
falling within the realm of commerce.220 Because Congress has used the Commerce
Clause to establish legislative authority over activities that, at least ostensibly, are
only tenuously commercial, this plenary authority can theoretically extend to include
abortion to the extent that abortions implicate economic activity on an interstate
level.221
This Part serves as an exploration of commercial activity in the context of
minors and their access to abortion, with an emphasis on the deleterious economic
effects of excluding sexual assault and incest exceptions from stringent abortion
regulations. A brief examination of those exceptions is followed by a discussion of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and inconsistencies therein. This Part also discusses
the Comment’s prescriptive claim—that under its plenary authority Congress should
act to protect minors from stringent abortion regulations that make no exception for
pregnancies resulting from acts of sexual violence.
A. The Argument for Exceptions
Republican-governed states that have a longstanding history of supporting
213
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anti-abortion legislation have upheld exceptions in three circumstances—when the
pregnancy is the result of sexual assault, incest, or when the pregnancy places the
woman’s life at risk.222 But while it may seem intuitive to include exceptions under
abortion mandates where a woman would otherwise be compelled to bear and raise a
child resulting from an act of sexual violence, sexual assault and incest exceptions
were surprisingly not always adopted or even viewed as standard.223 These
exceptions, first carved out in a model abortion law proposed by the American Law
Institute in 1959,224 were initially denounced by abortion opponents on the grounds
that unborn children resulting from sexual assault or incest were innocent despite the
circumstances under which they were conceived.225
Emphatically adhering to unconfirmed and unfounded scientific theory, some
anti-abortion activists went so far as to cast doubt on whether sexual assault victims
could in fact be impregnated by their assailants in the first place.226 One theorist
emphasized that, “as a scientific matter, it was nearly impossible for women to
become pregnant as a result of rape” and that women would jump at the opportunity
to “simply lie about sexual assault to get an abortion when they had consented to sex
all along.”227 This sentiment was largely embraced within the anti-abortion movement
and re- emphasized in 1976 when Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, a law
banning federal funding of abortions except in cases of sexual assault and incest.228
Anti-abortion activists argued that these exceptions should be eliminated lest a
woman “cry rape” in order to receive funding for the procedure.229
It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that sexual assault and incest became
largely accepted as valid exceptions to anti-abortion funding mandates.230 When
Republicans were pushing for a constitutional amendment that would effectively deny
women their right to the procedure, abortion-rights advocates were quick to remind
the American people that doing so would permit states to
enforce regulations that would force victims of sexual assault and incest to bear their
assailants’ children.231 Then, in 1990, the National Right to Life Committee, one of
the nation’s most prevalent anti-abortion groups, proposed a law that would ban most
abortions while including exceptions for sexual assault and incest.232 Yet, despite the
progress made toward a general acceptance and appreciation for the necessity of these
exceptions, the number of state legislatures that voiced their opposition to the
inclusion of these exceptions in 2019 alone demonstrate their widely contentious
reception.233
It should come as no surprise that forcing sexual assault and incest survivors to
222
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bear the children of their assailants can lead to numerous undesirable consequences.
“[Sexual assault] can cause bodily trauma, sexually transmitted diseases, and other
physical injuries inflicted during the assault,” as well as “[n]umerous psychological
effects . . . [such as] anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, and phobias.”234 A
resulting pregnancy then has the potential to “increase both the mental and physical
trauma experienced by the victim when she undergoes further physical and
psychological changes during her pregnancy.”235 Moreover, should the victim be
compelled to carry the pregnancy to term, she is then confronted by the added
pressure of choosing whether to maintain contact with the assailant as a result of
shared parental rights—a troubling prospect that may heighten or “prolong the
[negative] psychological effects of her situation.”236
Severe psychological trauma aside, forcing victims of sexual violence to bear
their assailants’ children implicates practical concerns as well, especially where the
victim is not in a position to financially care for the resultant child.237 Emphasizing
the “grave and indelible” consequences of forcing minors—some of whom have yet to
complete high school—to have children, the Supreme Court decided to extend judicial
bypass to minors in Bellotti. The decision hinged on a number of factors that included
a minor’s limited “education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional
maturity.”238 Recognition of these factors thus remains integral to a comprehensive
discussion of abortion that covers sexual assault and incest exceptions, especially
where the state’s asserted claim under its parens patriae interest purports to uphold a
duty to protect the best interests of its youth. If the state’s interest as articulated in
cases such as Prince and Meyer is truly concomitant with its goal of safeguarding
children “from abuses” such that they can be given the opportunity to grow into
healthy and productive individuals, then that interest should extend to include
minors who are financially, emotionally, and legally burdened by the responsibility of
bearing children born out of wanton acts of sexual violence.239 Deliberate ignorance of
these exceptions thus amounts to an irreconcilable impasse that puts states at odds
with their parens patriae obligation to foster the well-being of their most vulnerable
citizens.
B. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and its Inconsistencies
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the breadth of authority granted by the
Commerce Clause has considerably waxed and waned over time.240 It is precisely the
234
235
236
237

238
239
240

Margot E.H. Stevens, Note, Rape-Related Pregnancies: The Need to Create Stronger Protections for the VictimMother and Child, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 874 (2014).
Id.
Id.
See Schmidt, supra note 17, at 600:
Available data suggest that early motherhood, especially if unchosen, is potentially
devastating to a teenager’s short-term prospects for the future. Only half of all women who
bear their first child at age seventeen or younger will have finished high school by the
time they are thirty, and only one in fifty will finish college. Teenage mothers are also
more likely to rely on welfare than mothers in their twenties. Indeed, sixty-seven percent
of teenage mothers live in poverty. They are more likely than their childless peers to hold
low-prestige jobs that offer lower income, lower job satisfaction, and less opportunity for
advancement.
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variations and inconsistencies within the Court’s interpretations that have sparked
confusion over the extent to which Congress can act to regulate activity that enters
the realm of interstate commerce.241 A fairly narrow interpretation of the clause
prevailed between the late eighteenth century and early twentieth century.242
Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824, was the first seminal case to consider the type of
commerce covered by the clause and, incidentally, the extent to which congressional
authority was limited by that interpretation.243 In Gibbons, the Court was tasked
with determining whether congressional authority to regulate interstate steamboat
navigation fell within the scope of the Commerce Clause such that a New York
statute granting exclusive control over the transportation of passengers in a
particular area of the Hudson River was deemed unconstitutional.244 The Court
invalidated the New York statute, holding that “the federal legislation was a
legitimate use of [Congressional power pursuant to] the Commerce Clause” and that
the transportation of passengers— as opposed to solely goods—fell within the scope of
activity deemed sufficiently commercial in nature.245
In the years following its decision in Gibbons, the Court upheld a definition of
interstate commerce that was, for the most part, narrowly confined to matters
affecting transportation between the states, thus removing other activities that
impacted the economy—such as the production of goods, labor, and employment—
from Congress’s regulatory influence.246 This changed in 1937 when the Court decided
the case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.247 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court
determined that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935—which created the
National Labor Relations Board (NRLB) and gave employees across the nation the
power to unionize and engage in collective bargaining practices248—was a valid
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.249 Because the Act’s
“findings” section delineated the ways in which local unfair labor practices adversely
impacted the national economy, the Court’s holding acknowledged that activities that
appeared “intrastate in character” fell within congressional reach “if they ha[d] such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control [was] essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”250 This
decision marked a tectonic shift in the understanding of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause and expanded Congress’s regulatory power to encompass
a range of activities—both intrastate and interstate—if any one of those activities
sufficiently implicated the economy in some tenable way.251
Two cases following Jones & Laughlin served to solidify this expansive
interpretation of congressional Commerce Clause authority: United States v. Darby,
decided in 1941, and Wickard v. Filburn, decided a year later, in 1942.252 In Darby,
the Court held that “[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined
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to the regulation of commerce among the states” and that “[i]t extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . as to make [their]
regulation . . . appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end.”253
This holding was echoed a year later in Wickard when the Court concluded that
Congress’s regulation of intrastate activity was a valid exercise of its Commerce
Clause authority where the aggregate effect of any local activity implicated the
economy on a national level.254 In Wickard, a farmer challenged the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 after he was fined for growing wheat “in excess of [the
amount permitted per] the marketing quota established for his farm.”255 The Act
purported to “control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign
commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally
low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce.”256 The farmer contested the
Act on the grounds that his wheat production was “local in character” such that its
effect upon interstate commerce was “at most ‘indirect’” and thus “beyond the reach of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.”257 The Court rejected this
argument, predicating its holding on the principle that the farmer’s excess wheat
production while “trivial by itself [was] not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where . . . his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, [was] far from trivial.”258
For over fifty years following Wickard, it seemed as though Congress had been
given plenary authority to implement and enforce legislation so long as its connection
to interstate commerce was justifiable on nominally rational grounds.259 That not a
single federal statute was struck down between 1937 and 1995 as exceeding its grant
of authority under its Commerce Clause power stands as proof of Congress’s near
total control to regulate interstate and intrastate commerce during this time.260 It was
also during this period that the federal government purported to act pursuant to its
constitutionally sanctioned authority for the purpose of regulating against social
harms, such as racial discrimination, and environmental harms, such as the depletion
of natural resources.261 The Civil Rights Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Clean Water Act are examples of how Congress, under an expansive interpretation of
its constitutional power to regulate commerce, succeeded in passing legislation
intended to adequately address national problems otherwise ineffectually solved at
the local or state level.262
When the Court vindicated Congress’s enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, it did so on the grounds that
interstate commerce was implicated where “racial discrimination had the effect of
253

254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). The Court here was again tasked with determining whether
federal legislation—this time the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938—fell within Congress’s power to
control interstate commerce. The FLSA mandated the exclusion from interstate commerce of goods produced
“under conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health
and general well-being” to prevent the “spreading and perpetuating [of] such substandard labor conditions
among the workers of several states.” Id. at 109–10. Darby, a lumber manufacturer, was charged with
violating the labor practices set forth in FLSA after shipping lumber out of state. Id. at 111.
Moorman, supra note 240, at 690.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113 (1942).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 127–28.
See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 303.
See id.
Id. at 312.
Id.

284

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[10:257

discouraging [interstate] travel” within the African American community.263 In a
unanimous decision written by Justice Clark, the Court outlined the extent to which
Congress was permitted to regulate interstate activity where racial discrimination
was implicated:
[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes
the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have
a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. One need only
examine the evidence which we have discussed above to see that
Congress may—as it has—prohibit racial discrimination by motels
serving travelers, however ‘local’ their operations may appear.264
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress’s freedom to
regulate in accordance with a broad interpretation of its Commerce Clause power
seemed virtually limitless.265 This freedom, however, came to a halt in 1995 when the
Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez prescribed a narrower application of
Congressional Commerce Clause authority, thus curtailing the expansive legislative
liberty Congress had previously enjoyed.266 In Lopez, the Court addressed the validity
of the Guns-Free School Zone Act of 1990, a criminal statute in which Congress made
it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”267 Because
the Act did not “regulate[] a commercial activity []or contain[] a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce,” the Court held that
enforcement of the Act fell outside the scope of authority granted to Congress under
the Commerce Clause.268
The Court’s discussion of the statute’s attenuated link to economic activity
signified a return to an interpretation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence consistent
with cases predating Jones & Loughlin.269 Lopez thus identified and established a
new framework to be applied when evaluating federal legislation that purported to
serve as an extension of congressional Commerce Clause authority270:
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce .
. . Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities . . . Congress’ commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
263
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interstate commerce.271
The Court further determined that in order for an activity to fall within the
scope of Congress’s power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause, it is insufficient
for the activity to merely “affect” interstate commerce.272 Rather, for an activity to fall
within Congress’s regulatory reach, the proper test is “whether the regulated activity
‘substantially affect[s]’ interstate commerce.”273
The Court’s decision five years later in United States v. Morrison cemented the
narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause that was cemented in Lopez.274 In
Morrison, a victim of sexual assault filed a civil suit against her assailants alleging
that the attack violated the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provided a
federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence.275 The district court
dismissed the suit on the grounds that neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress the authority to enact and enforce the
statute.276 The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to grant the appellee’s motion
to dismiss on the grounds articulated in Lopez—that an “interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has changed as [the] Nation has developed” and “that even under
[a] modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’s regulatory
authority is not without effective bounds.”277 Applying the three-part framework
established in Lopez, the Court maintained that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity” and that “Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity [should be upheld] only where that activity is
economic in nature.”278
In defense of the contested section of VAWA, Congress argued that gendermotivated violence affected interstate commerce “by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce . . . by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products.”279 The Court dismissed this
argument on the grounds that its reasoning was “unworkable” where the only
relevant question was whether Congress’s agenda under VAWA was demonstrative of
activity that impacted interstate commerce in a substantial way.280
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer, Justice Souter’s dissent
called into question the majority’s rejection of a jurisprudential tradition in which
Congress held the reins to control matters that, at least from a purely textual view,
fell outside the scope of its enumerated power to regulate economic activity among the
states.281 Under the old theory of federal Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
congressional power to legislate would have extended to gender-based violence where
it implicated interstate commerce by precluding “its most likely target—women—from
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full partic[ipation] in the national economy.”282 In fact, the dissenting opinion wholly
acknowledged that VAWA “would have passed muster at any time between Wickard
in 1942 and Lopez in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding
that congressional power under the Commerce Clause . . . extended to all activity
that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”283
Justice Souter drew on an analogy to the Agricultural Adjustment Act that was
challenged in Wickard in order to illustrate the dissenters’ contention that “[t]his new
characterization of substantial effects” was lacking in precedential support and that
an interpretation of federal Commerce Clause authority that upheld VAWA as valid
was warranted under the Court’s previous standard284:
In Wickard, we upheld the application of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act to the planting and consumption of homegrown wheat. The effect on
interstate commerce in that case followed from the possibility that
wheat grown at home for personal consumption could either be drawn
into the market by rising prices, or relieve its grower of any need to
purchase wheat in the market. The Commerce Clause predicate was
simply the effect of the production of wheat for home consumption on
supply and demand in interstate commerce. Supply and demand for
goods in interstate commerce will also be affected by the deaths of 2,000
to 4,000 women annually at the hands of domestic abusers, and by the
reduction in the work force by the 100,000 or more rape victims who lose
their jobs each year or are forced to quit. Violence against women may
be found to affect interstate commerce and affect it substantially.285
By illustrating a vacillating history of the Commerce Clause’s jurisprudential
interpretation, Justice Souter underscored the fragility of the Court’s stance on
governmental plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce286—a fragility
exemplified five years later in the 2005 case Gonzales v. Raich.287 The Court’s holding
in Raich represented a departure from the Morrison/Lopez era interpretation of
interstate commerce and a return to an earlier understanding of economic activity as
defined in Wickard and its progeny.288 In Raich, the Court held that even if an
activity is purely local it may still “be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.”289 Furthermore, Congress was essentially
given the authority to regulate any activity where a rational basis existed for
believing that such activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.290
Courts have struggled to definitively determine whether an abortion procedure
itself falls into a class of activity that is categorically commercial.291 While paying a
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physician to administer the procedure comes at a cost, whether this alone can suffice
to qualify the procedure as one that is economic is yet to be determined.292 Because
the Court’s previous understanding of the Commerce Clause extended to include all
activity with an aggregated substantial effect on interstate commerce, VAWA would
have conceivably passed muster under a different Supreme Court configuration for
reasons noted in Morrison’s dissenting opinion: that the deaths of thousands of
women “at the hands of domestic abusers” would affect the “[s]upply and demand for
goods in interstate commerce,” and that rape victims unable to work would generate a
surge in unemployment.293 For similar reasons, the aggregated consequence of
ignoring the needs of impregnated victims of sexual violence and incest who are likely
to forego opportunities to become financially solvent and contribute to a robust
economy has the potential to overwhelmingly impact interstate commerce, a prospect
that on its own would have warranted congressional action during the preLopez/Morrison era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.294
C. A Solution: Congress Should Use its Power Under the Commerce Clause to
Address States’ Failure to Reconcile Their Parens Patriae Duty with
Stringent Abortion Regulations
Congressional action that would compel states to include sexual assault and
incest exceptions in their abortion regulatory schemes is plausible under the theory
that Congress is positioned to formulate legislation enforceable under the Commerce
Clause. By emphasizing the aggregate effect on interstate economic activity inherent
in the rearing of unwanted children,295 as well as the adverse effects on foster care
and family support,296 Congress is able to impose regulatory measures that would
further an interest in controlling activities that substantially impact the economy. At
what point, then, does society decide that adolescent parenting becomes an
economically burdensome activity?
Because minors are least likely to be emotionally and financially prepared to
raise children, forcing them to endure motherhood when they are incapable of
supporting themselves presents a particularly oppressive situation that will
eventually develop into a financial impediment for society.297 “Restricting access to
abortion makes it more difficult for minors to complete their education and become
economically self-sufficient . . . [which] constrains young women’s ability to determine
their life’s course . . . .”298 Eliminating a minor’s ability to access abortion thus
obstructs the state’s goal of ensuring that minors—presumably including those that
are pregnant—are given the opportunity to successfully acquire the skills necessary to
join the workforce upon reaching adulthood.299 This, in turn, hinders their ability to
participate as productive members of society that are prepared to contribute to a
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growing and successful economy.300
Furthermore, prohibiting safe and easy access to abortions takes a toll on
taxpayers in a significant way. There are approximately 424,000 children that are
currently in foster care nationwide.301 A study from 2014 revealed that “more than
[nine billion] federal and state dollars are spent on caring for foster children through
the Social Security Act each year,” with additional costs allocated toward “medical
care, food stamps, cash welfare, and child care payments.”302 Studies have also
revealed that foster youth face a higher probability of financially burdening their
communities throughout their adult lives.303 At some point during their lifetime, a
third of former foster care children will wind up incarcerated.304 “By age 17, over half
of foster care youth [will] have experienced an arrest, conviction, or overnight stay in
a correctional facility.”305 Additionally, “[s]tudies have found that on average
taxpayers spend more than $300,000 on public assistance and incarceration costs over
the lifetime of each individual that ages out of the foster care system.”306
Foster care youth also face an elevated risk of homelessness.307 “Nationally,
50% of the homeless population have spent time in foster care,” while “20% of foster
children will become instantly homeless” after reaching the age of eighteen.308 While
only 1–3% of foster care youth will graduate from college, 25% of foster care youth
“who age out of the system will not graduate from high school or be able to pass their
GED.”309 Moreover, “[y]oung women in foster care are more than twice as likely to
become pregnant as [an adolescent or] teen[ager] than their non-system involved
peers,” and “half of children born to mothers in foster care will also enter into the
child welfare system by their second birthday,” thus perpetuating the cycle of teenage
pregnancy within the foster care system.310
These studies indicate that the short-term and long-term economic implications
of barring minors from safe and easy access to abortion procedures are staggering.
Still, there is room for Commerce Clause interpretation that would favor
congressional authority to alleviate the ramifications of teenage pregnancies and
adolescent parenting, depending on the lens through which that authority is
assessed.311 If a court applies the standard established in Lopez and Morrison, any
attempt by Congress to govern the manner in which states regulate activity that is
not purely economic, or activity that is too attenuated to squarely fit within the limits
of the Court’s pre-Wickard definition of commercial, would be challenged as
congressional overreach of authority and ultimately struck down.312
If, however, a court applies the Wickard (or, more recently, Raich) standard,
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congressional authority to take legislative action would hinge on whether Congress
can rationally conclude that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce and, to some degree, whether the activity itself is decidedly economic in
nature.313 Given the figures and statistics mentioned above, it is difficult to ignore the
social and financial consequences of society’s shouldered responsibility of caring for
children born to minors, especially where those children are the product of sexual
violence. Under cases like Wickard and Heart of Atlanta Motel, the direct and
indelible economic repercussions of teenage pregnancies resulting from sexual
violence present an opportunity for Congress to argue in favor of mandating states to
include assault and incest exceptions as part of their abortion regulatory schemes.
D. Potential Pitfalls and Implications
If Congress were to enact federal legislation mandating the inclusion of sexual
assault and incest exceptions for minors in state abortion regulations, doing so would
naturally raise questions as to whether such legislation would pass as a valid exercise
of federal Commerce Clause authority or be struck down as an encroachment on state
sovereignty.314 State legislatures largely comprised of pro-life advocates have already
demonstrated an unbending tenacity in their efforts to overturn Roe.315 An
unwillingness to yield to what could potentially be deemed as congressional overreach
under recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence will likely play out in the courts.316
Because statutes regulating abortion procedures intersect areas of the law that have
traditionally been regulated by the states,317 pro-life lawmakers would challenge the
proposed federal legislation by claiming that abortions fall within the realm of
activities that are beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.318
However, an alternative argument has its own merits, most of which rest on
the weight afforded to Congress to regulate areas of the law traditionally understood
to be within the states’ control.319 Although Morrison and Lopez ostensibly
maintained the importance of precluding congressional encroachment on state
sovereignty, whether a federal statute may intrude into an area of law traditionally
governed by the state is not as clearly addressed or as critical under Raich.320
Therefore, the question of how far “Congress may go in regulating these types of
traditionally state-governed areas” of law, such as family law or health care, has yet
to be answered.321
Beyond the potential legal pitfalls of a federal statute enforcing the inclusion of
sexual violence exceptions for minors, Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe outlining the
ramifications of forced motherhood provides insight as to what relief might look like
for the impregnated teenage victims of sexual assault and incest, as well as society at
large.322 The imminent mental and physical harms, and “the problem of bringing a
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child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it,” are
afflictions that can be directly alleviated through recourse in the form of federallyimposed inclusion of these exceptions.323
Moreover, while adolescent parenting lends itself to undesirable outcomes for
teenage mothers, “most policy analysts and social scientists agree that adolescent
parenting” bears negative consequences for the children born to minors, as they face
an increased risk of confronting health, educational, and developmental problems
throughout their lifetimes.324 These, too, are consequences that could be avoided by
requiring statutory exceptions in cases of sexual violence against minors. Finally, as
discussed in Part III(C), the financial repercussions resulting from a failure to
address the onerous challenges faced by minors forced to carry unwanted children to
full term—such as “additional tax burdens and lost productivity”—are costs that
society can avert under the proposed federally-enacted mandate.325
CONCLUSION
For adolescent parents, the negative consequences of forced child-rearing are
unquestionably injurious, and this is especially true where the minor is a victim of
sexual violence. Where a minor’s choice to terminate her pregnancy has been forfeited
in the name of protecting a product of sexual assault or incest, states offer no relief to
the victimized adolescent or to those strained by the consequences of caring for a child
when physically, psychologically, and financially unprepared to do so. Now that the
Supreme Court’s configuration seemingly favors a conservative agenda, the possibility
that anti-abortion advocates will succeed in their attempts to challenge precedent
established in Roe represents a concrete threat to women and pro-choice proponents
nationwide.
Still, recourse is available. Exercising its Commerce Clause authority, Congress
can push states to include sexual assault and incest exceptions in their abortion
regulatory schemes by asserting that teenage pregnancies amount to considerable
costs to taxpayers and to the nation’s overall economic productivity. Thus, having an
opportunity to predicate federal legislation on the deleterious economic repercussions
of raising a child that neither the adolescent parent nor society is ready or willing to
care for, Congress should act to preclude states from excluding exceptions from their
abortion laws that, if absent, would have indelible consequences for impregnated
victims of sexual violence.
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